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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael J. Breinholt appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon 
his guilty pleas to four counts of selling unregistered securities. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Breinholt and his father pooled their money to purchase a promissory note 
for $128,000 from Annuit Coeptis, an entity run by Gabriel Joseph. (R., p.286.) 
The note promised a high monthly interest rate. (Id.) While Breinholt saw no 
financial statements from Annuit Coeptis, he understood that Joseph was 
working with Founder's Capital, a real estate investment entity run by Rich 
Koerber. (Id.) 
Breinholt then formed Streamline Financial and began selling promissory 
notes of his own. (R., pp.286-287; PSI, p.2.) The notes promised investors 
returns of 18% to 30% annually. (R., pp.286-287.) Breinholt initially sold these 
notes to family and members of his church, and then through Silverstate 
Mortgage, a local company. (R., p.287.) In all, Breinholt collected approximately 
$3.5 million from at least 22 investors. (R., p.287; PSI, p.2.) Breinholt 
represented to the investors that the investments were "safe" and backed by real 
property and other hard assets, but did not provide information relating to the 
financial condition or operating results of Streamline Financial, which never itself 
purchased or owned any real estate. (R., pp.287-288; PSI, p.2.) Breinholt sent 
much of the investment money he collected to Annuit Coeptis and North 
American Capitol Trust, the latter a company formed by the individuals who 
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operated the local Silverstate Mortgage office. (R., pp.287-288.) 
For a time, Breinholt received interest payments from Annuit and North 
American Capitol Trust, and made interest payments to those who had invested 
in his Streamline Financial entity. (R., pp.287-288; see generally PSI, pp.31-47, 
91-145) However, Breinholt stopped receiving payments from Annuit in August 
2007, and from North American Capitol Trust in October 2007. (R., p.289.) 
Breinholt continued to collect new funds from investors until December 2007, but 
stopped making payments to his own investors the same month. (R., p.290.) 
The Idaho Department of Finance sued Breinholt and his companies. 
(PSI, pp.48-60.) Breinholt admitted committing fraud under the Uniform 
Securities Act, I.C. § 30-14-501, and agreed to an entry of a judgment against 
him for $5 million, which included provisions for restitution payments to his 
victims. (PSI, pp.48-60.) 
After the resolution of the civil case, a grand jury indicted Breinholt on 
eight counts of securities fraud, seven counts of selling unregistered securities, 
two counts of grand theft, and six sentencing enhancements for knowingly 
accepting money representing equity in a person's home in connection with 
committing securities fraud. (R., pp.13-29.) 
Breinholt initially represented himself in the criminal case. (See R., pp.37-
38, 45-47.) At a scheduled status conference, Breinholt, who the district court 
observed was draped in "a flag of some sort," stood, but refused to come into the 
courtroom well. (R., pp.50-57.) Breinholt stated that he was the "beneficiary of a 
trust" and requested that the court recognize his "sovereign status." (Id.) After 
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Breinholt continued to refuse court orders to come forward, the district court held 
Breinholt in contempt and ordered that he serve three days in jail. (Id.) The 
court also appointed the public defender to represent Breinholt, and ordered that 
Breinholt undergo an I.C. § 18-211 competency evaluation. (R., pp.58-60, 104-
105.) Breinholt then secured private counsel to represent him. (R., p.116.) 
Breinholt's evaluation indicated that he was competent to proceed, and both 
parties and the court accepted this conclusion. (See R., pp.126-127.) 
Breinholt's private counsel then moved to withdraw after communications 
between he and Breinholt broke down, and after Breinholt delivered a letter to 
counsel unequivocally firing him. (R., pp.154-161, 163.) The district court 
granted the motion and appointed the public defender's office to represent 
Breinholt as stand-by counsel. (R., pp.179-180, 182-186.) 
Breinholt then made several prose filings, including a "Motion in Limine to 
Dismiss Criminal Complaint." (R., pp.218-219, 261-273.) In this motion, 
Breinholt asserted that the criminal charges against him should be dismissed 
because Boise and Ada County law enforcement officers lacked jurisdiction to 
arrest him, because The Hon. Patrick Owen should have recused himself from 
the case, and because his Fifth Amendment rights were violated. (R., pp.261-
267.) However, at the subsequent hearing on both parties' outstanding pretrial 
motions, the state and Breinholt informed the court1 that they had reached a 
resolution and that Breinholt wished to plead guilty. (Tr., p.1, L.6 - p.6, L.13.) 
1 Due to a scheduling conflict, a substitute judge presided over the change of 
plea hearing. (Tr., p.1, Ls.3-21.) Judge Owen returned to preside over 
Breinholt's sentencing hearing. (R., pp.304-306; Tr., p.37, L.3 - p.87, L.7.) 
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Pursuant to a plea agreement, Breinholt entered Alford 2 pleas to four counts of 
selling unregistered securities, and the state dismissed the remaining charges. 
(Tr., p.1, L.3. - p.27, L.22; PSI, pp.28-30.) 
Breinholt secured new private counsel to represent him at the sentencing 
hearing. (R., pp.283-284.) The district court withheld judgment, placed Breinholt 
on probation for 20 years, and imposed 180 days jail with credit for 53 days 
served as a condition of probation. (R., pp.307-314.) The court further ordered 
that Breinholt pay $240,000 in restitution. (Id.) Finally, the court placed 
Breinholt on probation for 20 years, and imposed probation terms designed to 
maximize the likelihood that Breinholt would meet his restitution obligations. (Id.) 
Specifically, Breinholt was ordered to: maintain steady employment or be actively 
seeking employment, establish a budget with his probation officer and verify 
income and expenses, and not have any credit cards or incur any new 
indebtedness unless specifically approved by his probation o'fficer. (Id.) 
Breinholt timely appealed. (R., pp.315-319.) 
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
4 
ISSUE 
Breinholt's brief does not contain a statement of issues on appeal as 
required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4). By its order dated June 21, 2012, the Idaho Supreme 
Court granted Breinholt's "Motion to File Non-Conforming Brief on Appeal" and 
accepted Breinholt's Appellant's brief as filed. (6/12/12 Order.) Throughout his 
brief, Breinholt asserts that district court judge Patrick Owen should have 
recused himself from Breinholt's criminal case because he had previously 
presided over Breinholt's civil case. (See generally, Appellant's brief.) 
The state phrases the issues on appeal as: 
Has Breinholt failed to show that the trial court judge erred in failing to 
recuse himself from Breinholt's case? 
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ARGUMENT 
Breinholt Has Failed To Show That The Trial Court Judge Erred In Failing To 
Recuse Himself From Breinholt's Case 
A. Introduction 
Breinholt contends that the trial court judge presiding over his criminal 
case erred by failing to recuse himself. generally. Appellant's brief.) It is 
unclear whether Breinholt contends that the district court erred in not construing 
his motion to dismiss as a motion to disqualify the trial court judge, or whether he 
asserts that the trial court judge should have affirmatively recused himself. In 
either instance, Breinholt's claims fail. 
Breinholt cannot show that the district court erred in not construing his 
motion to dismiss as a motion to disqualify because his motion to dismiss did not 
satisfy the requirements of a motion to disqualify a judge for cause pursuant to 
1.C.R. 25(c). Further, even if the district court erred in failing to rule on 
Breinholt's attempted disqualification motion, any such error was both invited and 
harmless. Finally, Breinholt failed to preserve any claim that the trial court judge 
should have affirmatively recused himself, and in any event, Breinholt has 
asserted no actual bias or other grounds for disqualification. 
B. The District Court Did Not Err In Declining To Construe Breinholt's Motion 
To Dismiss As A Motion To Disqualify The Trial Court Judge 
Idaho Criminal Rule 25(b)(4) allows for the disqualification of a judge who 
is "biased or prejudiced for or against any party or that party's case in the action." 
Disposition of a motion to disqualify is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. State v. Elliott, 126 Idaho 323, 329, 882 P.2d 978, 984 (Ct App. 1994). 
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Idaho Criminal Rule 25(c) requires a motion to disqualify for cause be 
"accompanied by an affidavit of the party or that party's attorney stating distinctly 
the grounds upon which disqualification is based and the facts relied upon in 
support of the motion." Such a motion need be granted only where there is 
actual prejudice against the litigant of such a nature as to render it improbable 
that the presiding judge could or would give the litigant a fair and impartial trial. 
Cook v. State, 144 Idaho 482, 492, 180 P.3d 521, 531 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing 
Elliott, 126 Idaho at 329, 882 P.2d at 984). When a party files a motion for 
disqualification pursuant to I.C.R. 25, the presiding judge lacks authority to act 
further in the proceedings until it grants or denies the motion. I.C.R. 25(e). 
Breinholt never brought an I.C.R. 25 motion to disqualify the trial court 
judge for cause in this case, and he therefore cannot show that the district court 
erred in declining to rule on any such motion before accepting Breinholt's guilty 
plea or sentencing him. While Breinholt asserted that the trial court judge should 
have recused I·1imself as one of his proposed grounds for dismissal in his "Motion 
in Limine to Dismiss Criminal Complaint," that motion did not constitute an I.C.R. 
25 motion to disqualify for several reasons. First, Breinholt's motion did not cite 
I.C.R. 25. Second, nowhere in the motion did Breinholt request that the trial 
court judge be disqualified from the case; Breinholt instead simply moved for 
dismissal of the criminal charges. Third, the motion was not accompanied by an 
affidavit stating the grounds for disqualification, as required by I.C.R. 25(c). 
Finally, at the change of plea hearing, despite the district court's attempts to have 
Breinholt clarify the purpose of his motion, Breinholt never asserted that he 
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wished to disqualify the trial court judge for cause. (See Tr., p.1, L.3 - p.36, 
L.11.) In fact, to the contrary, when the district court inquired about the issue, 
Breinholt responded, "I had an objection to the rescheduling order was really 
what [the motion to dismiss] was. I did want [Judge Owen] to stay on the case so 
that we could go through the trial with him. That's something that I would have to 
research to see if I did want to have Judge Owen." (Tr., p.32, L.25 - p.33, L.5.) 
The district court informed Breinholt that if he wished to file a motion to disqualify 
Judge Owen for cause, he could still do so prior to sentencing, and Breinholt 
indicated he would consider doing so. 3 (Tr., p.32, L.9- p.36, L.10.) The content 
of Breinholt's motion to dismiss and the actions and statements of Breinholt and 
the district court demonstrate that the motion did not constitute an I.C.R. 25 
motion to disqualify Judge Owen. The district court thus did not err in declining 
to rule on any such motion. 
Further, even if the district court erred in declining to rule on Breinholt's 
attempted motion to disqualify, Breinholt is precluded from challenging any error 
by the doctrine of invited error. A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited 
error, from complaining that a ruling or action of the trial court that the party 
invited, consented to, or acquiesced in was error. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 
389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000). The purpose of the invited error 
doctrine is to prevent a party who "caused or played an important role in 
3 Even if Breinholt made an I.C.R. 25 motion to disqualify Judge Owen, the 
substitute judge handling the change of plea hearing would have had authority to 
accept Breinholt's guilty pleas prior to any ruling on the motion to disqualify. 
I.C.R. 25(e) precludes only the "presiding judge" of a case (i.e., the judge subject 
to the disqualification motion), from taking any action prior to ruling on an I.C.R. 
25 motion to disqualify for cause. 
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prompting a trial court" to take a particular action from "later challenging that 
decision on appeal." State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 
(1999). Moreover, the failure to raise an issue before the trial court waives that 
issue for the purposes of appeal. State v. Lenon, 143 Idaho 415, 416-418, 146 
P .3d 681, 683-84 (Ct. App. 2006). 
In this case, Breinholt clearly acquiesced in any district court error not to 
rule on his attempted disqualification of Judge Owen. During the scheduled 
hearing on his "Motion in Limine to Dismiss Criminal Complaint" and other pretrial 
motions, Breinholt both informed the court that he wished to enter guilty pleas to 
some of the charges, and, as discussed above, assured the court that he wished 
for Judge Owen to continue presiding over the case. (Tr., p.1, L.3 - p.36, L.11.) 
At no time during the hearing did Breinholt request that the court rule on either 
his motion to dismiss, or on any motion to disqualify Judge Owen. Because 
Breinholt clearly acquiesced in any district court error not to rule on any 
attempted motion to disqualify Judge Owen, Breinholt invited such error and is 
precluded from challenging this issue on appeal. 4 
Finally, any district court error is harmless. "Any error, defect, irregularity 
or variance which does not affect substantial rights should be disregarded." 
I.C.R. 52. As discussed below, Breinholt asserted no actual bias that would have 
required Judge Owen to disqualify himself from the case pursuant to l.C.R. 
4 Similarly, this Court could find that Breinholt waived this issue by abandoning 
his motion to dismiss. See Lenon, 143 Idaho at 416-418, 146 P.3d at 683-684 
(holding that by raising and then abandoning a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
Lenon "purposefully limited the thoroughness of the record on appeal" and that 
the Court would "not reward this tactic"). 
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25(d)(4). Because Breinholt's meritless motion would not have led to 
disqualification of Judge Owen, the court's failure to rule on his motion did not 
affect his substantial rights. The district court's failure to rule on Breinholt's 
motion, even if error, is thus harmless. 
To the extent this Court construes Breinholt's appeal as alleging that the 
district court erred in declining to rule on any attempted motion for 
disqualification, this claim fails. Breinholt never filed a proper I.C.R. 25 motion to 
disqualify Judge Owen for cause. Even if the district court should have 
construed Breinholt's motion as a motion to disqualify, any error in not ruling on it 
was invited by Breinholt and was harmless. This Court should therefore affirm 
Breinholt's convictions. 
C. The Trial Court Judge Did Not Err In Failing To Affirmatively Recuse 
Himself 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
Carlson, 134 Idaho at 398, 3 P.3d at 76. Absent a timely objection, the appellate 
courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the fundamental error 
doctrine. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588, 261 P.3d 853, 865 (2011); State 
v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P .3d 961, 979 (2010) (re-articulating the Idaho 
fundamental error standard for claims raised for the first time on appeal). In 
order to establish fundamental error, under Perry, an appellant must demonstrate 
that the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional 
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not 
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contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure 
to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." kl at 228, 245 
P.3d at 980. 
Prior to Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a defendant's assertion, 
made for the first time on appeal, that he was deprived of his constitutional right 
to a fair trial because the trial court judge was biased against him could not 
constitute fundamental error and could not be raised for the first time on appeal. 
State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596-597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308-1309 (1992); 
State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 918-919, 854 P.2d 259, 260-262 (1993). 
However, in Knowlton, the Idaho Supreme Court distinguished that issue from 
the issue Breinholt appears to raise in this case - whether a trial court judge errs 
in not affirmatively disqualifying himself from a case. kl at 919-920, 854 P .2d at 
262-263. Without referencing fundamental error, the Idaho Supreme Court cited 
the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct and considered the merits of Knowlton's 
claim that the trial court judge should have affirmatively disqualified himself. kl 
The Court held that the judge's service on the Governor's Task Force for 
Children at Risk did not necessitate recusal from Knowlton's case. kl Thus, the 
Idaho Supreme Court appeared to imply that a judge's failure to affirmatively 
disqualify himself for bias could constitute fundamental error reviewable for the 
first time on appeal. 
In this case, however, Breinholt has failed to show any error, let alone the 
"plain error" required by the second prong of the Perry fundamental error test. 
On appeal, Breinholt has not asserted that Judge Owen was actually biased 
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against him except to state that "it was obvious to anyone that Judge Owen's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned due to him being the judge in the civil 
case." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) However, the fact that Judge Owen previously 
presided over Breinholfs civil case did not, by itself, establish bias, and did not, 
by itself, require Judge Owen to affirmatively disqualify himself from Breinholt's 
criminal case. 
While a trial court judge is subject to recusal from a case if he previously 
served as counsel for any party in the proceeding, I.C.R. 25(b)(3); Idaho Code of 
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E)(1 ), the Idaho appellate courts have consistently 
held that judges are not required to recuse themselves when they have 
previously presided over related proceedings involving the same parties. 
Specifically, the Idaho appellate courts have held that trial court judges are not 
required to recuse themselves where: the trial court judge continued to preside 
over a criminal case on remand after an appellate court held that the trial court 
judge had erred, State v. Jones, 146 Idaho 297, 298-300, 193 P.3d 457, 458-460 
(Ct. App. 2008); the trial court judge presided over a defendant's post-conviction 
proceeding after previously presiding over the defendant's sentencing hearing in 
the underlying criminal case, State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 107, 967 P.2d 702, 
721 (Ct. App. 1998); the trial judge entertained an I.C.R. 35 motion where it had 
previously imposed the sentence being challenged, State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 
208, 214-215, 766 P.2d 678, 685-686 (1998); see also State v. Zamora, 129 
Idaho 817,818,933 P.2d 106, 107 (1997) (holding that the trial court judge was 
not required to recuse himself where he had been the prosecuting attorney in 
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one of the cases alleged as the basis for a persistent violator charge in the new 
case); State v. Gri'ffith, 144 Idaho 356, 361, 161 P.3d 675, 680 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(holding that trial court judge who expressed a belief in defendant's guilt at a pre-
trial conference was not required to recuse himself where he was not the trier of 
fact on the issue of the defendant's guilt, and where defendant did not show that 
court's opinion unfairly infected the court's rulings). 
As the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Beam, "[a] trial judge is not required 
to erase from his mind all that has gone before, and indeed, it is doubtful that any 
human being could." ~ at 215, 766 P.2d at 685. Additionally, "[t]hat judges are 
capable of disregarding that which should be disregarded is a well accepted 
precept in our judicial system." Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 205, 731 P.2d 
192, 200 (1986) (quoting Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 811 (11 th Cir. 1983)). 
It is actual bias or prejudice, not mere participation in a previous or related case, 
or even an opinion about a defendant's guilt, which necessitates judicial recusal. 
Similarly, Breinholt has established no per se grounds for qualification based on 
Judge Owen having previously presided over Breinholt's civil case. 
To the extent this Court construes Breinholt's appeal as attempting to 
assert, for the first time on appeal, that the trial court judge should have 
affirmatively recused himself for bias, Breinholt has failed to show error, let alone 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Breinholt's 
convictions and sentences for four counts of selling unregistered securities. 
DATED this 13th day of September 2012 
MARK W. OLSON ~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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